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1. The mental framework: The Leadership Aversion Theory of European Politics 
Asking for the improvement of the EU’s foreign policy is asking Kissinger’s phone number 
question over and over again. The phone number question is essentially a leadership question. 
And all the institutional reform efforts we have been observing ever since the commencement 
of the Constitutional Convention’s work in February 2002, including the infamous “reflection 
period” after the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, have basically been 
mostly that: a leadership debate. While talking institutions, the EU is in fact trying to figure 
out leadership as its core political problem: how to enable leadership in Europe, how to 
channel it, how to curb it, how to make it effective and participatory at the same time. The 
difficulty stems, of course, from the fact that generating compromise among as many as 27 
member states is endlessly more difficult than doing the same thing with fewer states at the 
table. The underlying reason for this difficulty, however, is less technical. It’s historical and 
cultural and therefore much harder to alleviate. 
 
In its essence, the very idea of strong leadership as a political principle among European 
nation states is against all historical instincts of a continent that traditionally was and is much 
more at ease with balance of power politics. The continent has learned the lesson that, when 
in the history of modern Europe, strong leadership emerged from within continental Europe, 
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this leadership has, more often than not, proven disastrous for the continent. The catastrophic 
experiences of the 30-years war, Napoleon’s aggressive reign, the World Wars I and II have 
taught the continent two things: (1) to rigorously balance out the urges and the ambitions of 
its major powers, and (2) to import leadership from the outside instead of generating it from 
within Europe. I call this the “Leadership Aversion Theory of European Politics”.  
 
For a long period, Britain served as the required outside balancer, providing the necessary 
leadership to preserve the precarious stability on the continent. When Britain was reduced to a 
small power after World War II, Europe looked for an alternative source for the direly needed 
import. At the same time, the United States decided to finally become a European power. By 
means of NATO, the Marshall Plan and by supporting the early steps of European integration, 
the U.S. served as the guarantor of stability, the provider of security and the purveyor of 
leadership for continental Europe – up to this day. 
 
But while being protected and led by an outside power, the Europeans did not sit around idly. 
In order to deal with their own inner workings, they created an intricate power-sharing and 
leadership-avoiding system called the EU, complete with interlocking institutions and no 
single European country in the driver’s seat.2  This system’s institutions either received in-
built weakeners, such as national vetoes in the Council, or they were given relatively confined 
and clearly defined portfolios (such as the Commission and The European Court of Justice). 
Matters of security and defense were excluded from this program. 
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This divisioon of labour worked and served the interests of all those involved very well. Then 
the end of the cold war and its extremely stimulating effect on globalising forces 
fundamentally changed the political set-up. Leadership import from the U.S. was much less a 
given now. Europeans, gradually, had to learn to guarantee stability, peace and prosperity 
themselves, at least to a much higher degree than before. When so challenged, in order to 
make the EU more politically apt, they followed their well-developed instincts of power-
sharing and inward balancing. The results were the Maastricht Treaty and its follow-up 
treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. In Maastricht, for the first time, Europe really attempted to 
square the circle: to allow for stronger European political leadership while at the same time 
upholding the intricate interlocking power-sharing principle. But as the entire idea of self-
generated European leadership goes against the instincts of Europe, these treaty compromises 
all look awfully just like that: compromise. The strongest advocate for limited European 
leadership and for the upholding of the balance-of-power system is the traditional European 
balancer, the United Kingdom, now itself an EU partner. As the UK is not in the position to 
single-handedly impose its political will on the continent, it follows a dual-track strategy: 
keeping the relatively weak political construction of the EU as weak as possible while at the 
same time strongly advocating external leadership import from the U.S..  
 
This post-cold-war order was functional as long as Europe could keep itself busy with 
expansion, the monetary union, the constitution, etc., i.e. with looking inwardly, regulating 
internal affairs, balancing and stabilizing an ever-growing club of nations. This period is now 
coming to an end. In a globalised world, much more is asked of the EU than mere navel-
gazing. It is now common wisdom that Europe “must do more” to deal with conflicts around 
the world and the threats and challenges imposed by terrorism, poverty, ethnic strife, 
demographic development, human rights violations, trade imbalances, etc.  
 
Today, with 27 member states on board, for Europe to punch its weight in world affairs, it 
must unite and act as one. For this it needs leadership. But who is going to provide it? What 
kind of collective construction (because collective it must be) could create the momentum to 
pull the 27 into one direction? How do you create institutions that allow for leadership while 
at the same time do not infringe the historic power-sharing compromise that has guaranteed 
peace and prosperity in Europe in the last half century? This is precisely the question at the 
centre of all the debate we currently observe. The historical background makes it easier to 
understand why the current constitutional debate is so fierce. It explains why the current 
debate is not just a technical quarrel about Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), symbols of 
statehood, and stronger institutions but a European soul-search. On the basis of this, let’s 
inquire into what to expect from the upcoming treaty negotiations. 
 
2. What will be the likely results of the upcoming EU treaty compromise? 
The provisions concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) written into the 
original draft constitution were among the least controversial parts of the entire document.3 
Primarily, this was due to the fact that these provisions did not substantially change the inter-
governmental method with its system of divided leadership and balanced decision-making.4 
Despite some hefty-looking institutional innovations, such as the proposed Foreign Minister, 
the fundamental principle of state sovereignty, i.e. national vetoes on all matters CFSP, 
remains untouched. If one is to believe the information leaking from the current negotiations, 
these provisions will most likely go into the new treaty compromise largely unchanged.  
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The new treaty will most likely establish three new institutions: 
a. A permanent Presidency of the European Union, i.e. a permanent chairmanship of the 
European Council, elected by qualified majority vote by the council. This creation will 
replace the largely inefficient and (to the outside world) rather confusing system of 
rotating six-months presidencies, shared equally among the 27 EU member states. The 
permanent presidency will  
i. chair the meetings of the European Council,  
ii. coordinate the European Council’s work,  
iii. be the highest formal external representative of the EU 
iv. try to streamline the European Council’s effectiveness as the EU’s 
primary legislative entity 
v. hold office for two and a half years (renewable once) 
vi. not hold any other national office 
The focus of the intended reform is clearly mostly managerial, not content-oriented. 
The permanent presidency will hold few hard powers. This is in stark contrast to the 
situation now, where the (still increasing) power of the presidency emerges from the 
combination of national leadership with the hugely important power to dictate the 
Council’s agenda and to take the initiative on whatever policy is deemed important.5 
Whether this change will have any positive impact on policy, especially the EU’s 
foreign policy, is doubtful.  
 
b. The second innovation will be the EU Foreign Minister, albeit under another title.6 
The Foreign Minister will be a very specific and typically European construction. He 
or she will be wearing two hats simultaneously, (a) the chairmanship of the Foreign 
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Affairs council of the EU and (b) the office of vice president of the European 
Commission. This dual capacity is the attempt to institutionalize better coordination 
between the council as the organ of the 27 member states, and the Commission with 
its vast independent administrative and technical expertise. According to the draft 
treaty’s Article I-28,  
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall conduct the Union's 
common foreign and security policy. He or she shall contribute by his or 
her proposals to the development of that policy, which he or she shall carry 
out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common 
security and defence policy. 
This makes the Minister (who is elected and removed by QMV in the Council) the 
member states’ executive arm but only if explicitly authorized. Thus, he or she will at 
best be a facilitator and enabler but not a leader. This construction would only be a 
slight improvement of the current situation and might therefore be called “Solana 2.0”. 
The meaning and the importance of this new position seems to be mostly dependent on 
the chosen candidate’s personal competence, stamina, charm, and cunning. Potentially, 
the minister could have considerable influence over the Council’s agenda, and could 
streamline its decision-making process. At this, he or she could profit from being a 
Commissioner, which, in itself, is a potential power base, but certainly not a 
guaranteed source of influence. Most importantly, he or she will simply not be able to 
force member towards a common position. They, and they alone, remain in charge. 
The only real meaningful novelty here is that instead of the troika formed by the 
Presidency, the High Representative and the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, the EU 
will be represented to the outside world by one person alone. To what extent the dual-
hat portfolio will create a dynamic leading to real influence in, or to a more cohesive 
nature of the EU’s foreign policy decision making process remains to be seen. The 
selection of an apt candidate seems to be crucial. Given past experience with the 
Commission President, it seems likely that the member states will be tempted to 
choose a relatively weak candidate in order to keep things under control. On top of 
this, it remains unclear how the Foreign Minister and the newly established President 
of the European Council organize a sensible division of labour. Potentially, they could 
well be rivals, thereby creating less cohesiveness and less effectiveness instead of 
more. 
 
c. The third innovation will probably be the External Action Service (EAS) of the EU, 
i.e. a quasi Foreign Service, complete with diplomatic status and direct accountability 
to the Foreign Minister. In the upcoming new treaty, the design of this new instrument 
might differ considerably from how it was supposed to be in the original draft treaty. 
The original design drew heavy flak from anti-statehood activists, and its substance 
seems to be part of the current negotiations. Originally, the EAS was supposed to be 
staffed by civil servants from the EU Council and by delegates of national diplomatic 
services. Fears in Brussels are that the EAS will not receive the desired degree of 
independence from nation states, thus making it a potential playground for national 
meddling and infighting. Although a new treaty is far from being adopted, the EU has 
already started setting up the service.  
 
These institutional changes are not being accompanied by any substantial procedural change 
concerning CFSP. Nowhere in this field have any relevant competences been assigned to 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). This, more than anything else, indicates that member 
states were not willing to shift any foreign policy competence from the national level to the 
supra-national level.  
 
Summing up, it is clear that foreign policy remains the domain of national sovereignty. For 
many this will undoubtedly be good news, as it will keep the EU from slowly and 
clandestinely turning into a federal super state. For others, this will be bad news, as it will 
perpetuate the status of the EU as something that’s less than the sum of its parts, being utterly 
dependent on the willingness of nation states to each time slowly create a unified will in order 
to act as one. For some this is the outcome of a healthy kind of realism, for others it means 
keeping the EU a foreign policy dwarf.  
 
3. What will be the likely foreign policy results? 
The most likely result of the expected institutional changes will be a continuation of the case-
by-case foreign policy we have so far been observing. This means that, on occasion, the 27 
member states will be able to create a unified approach to a foreign policy problem (as in the 
case of a unified stand on the Iranian nuclear program, the peace-keeping missions in the 
Congo and Macedonia), but mostly this will not be the case (as with the great division over 
the Iraq war and the Russian energy strategy). There might be a slight chance that in cases 
where the EU does indeed want to act as one, a strong Foreign Minister will enable the EU to 
implement policies quicker. But this will in any case only be possible after the member states 
have made up their minds. All the classic and decisive decision-making steps need to be taken 
by member states first: the identification and acknowledgement of a problem, the unified 
assessment of its importance, the definition of a shared interest and the mustering of a unified 
will to act. In some of this, the Foreign Minister might actually be rather helpful. But 
essentially, member states are on their own to take these steps, and they might even be 
tempted to circumvent the EU entirely. European Foreign policy is and will remain the 
creation of member states that have decided to employ the European Union as a means to 
their end. It is not an end in itself. 
 
This leads to the question how the necessary consensus in those cases can be created. Which, 
in turn, brings us back to the question of leadership. Traditionally, in foreign policy, the EU 
has been able to act in a unified way whenever its three major powers, Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom, could agree to do so (in some instances the Franco-German tandem was 
sufficient). Says Ulrich Speck, author of Kosmoblog, the German weekly’s Die Zeit foreign 
policy blog7:  
“It's no accident that they formed the EU-3 in order to negotiate with Tehran – 
bypassing Brussels (…) European action can only come from the European actors and 
these are mainly the big three.”  
In this, the EU has not changed significantly from the times when it was a small six-member 
club. Leadership matters and only the big states can deliver it. More importantly, this 
leadership necessarily must be collective leadership. No single state will be allowed to 
exercise leadership alone for a prolonged period of time. Only this way, the delicate and basic 
compromise in the EU (as formulated above in the leadership aversion theory) and thus the 
inner peace of the EU can be maintained. The tediousness of its foreign policy decision-
making process and the slowness of its reactions abroad are the price for peace at home.  
 
But even with leadership being exercised by the big three, compromise is harder to reach 
within the EU-27 than within the EU-15 or the EU-6. Therefore, it seems to be unavoidable 
that unified EU action is getting rarer and rarer. At the same time, the sheer necessity to act as 
one in an ever-more complicated, globalised world might be able to create just the kind of 
outside pressure the EU has always been very good at reacting to. With fresh political 
personnel being in place in the big-three countries, the chances for leadership might be greater 
now than at any point in the last few years.  
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4. Will the changes enable the EU to play a global role while allowing for further 
enlargement? 
The capacity of the EU to play a global role will with some certainty not be greatly enhanced 
by the expected new treaty.8 The EU will remain being a trade power house of global status, it 
will remain being the foremost provider of foreign aid, and it will remain being a net-exporter 
of stability by executing accession talks and by implementing the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. It will not, however, turn into a singular foreign policy entity capable of projecting 
military power globally. It will not be able to muster its potential muscle as a guarantor of 
global stability and order.  
 
Concerning enlargement, the situation is less clear. On the one hand, the probable 
compromise on institutional change will surely not be sufficient to get rid of the institutional 
gridlock currently stifling the EU decision-making system. However, tackling this problem is 
widely seen as the precondition for further enlargement. Technically speaking, the answer to 
the above question should therefore be no. On the other hand, the news of a compromise 
found could create pressure on Brussels to again become more pro-active in enlargement. 
European leaders themselves have created conditionality between internal reform and 
enlargement. However, they have never defined the qualitative level of reform necessary to 
improve the EU’s “absorption capacity”. This lack of clarity could very well backfire as soon 
as some kind of compromise is found on the constitutional treaty. European leaders clearly 
need to define very precisely the exact conditions to be met by the EU itself for any kind of 
further enlargement. They also need to be frank about how far expansion might go in the 
future and about possible alternative models for stability esport. Otherwise they might find 
themselves in very awkward negotiation positions, with the result that the EU’s capacity to 
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exert a stabilizing, liberalizing and pacifying influence over its immediate surrounding could 
wane. This would be a severe shortcoming, if not a downright catastrophe. For it is 
enlargement and its great effect on Eastern Europe that is the biggest success story of 
European foreign policy – and one of the biggest success stories of Western soft power ever.  
 
5. How will the U.S. be affected? 
If the Foreign Minister were to be cretaed, the EU would finally have that famous phone 
number. It was sometimes claimed that this was already the case with Javier Solana being the 
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. But that was only partly true, because 
with the presidency and the External relations commissioner also being part of the game, it 
was at best down to three phone numbers. This would be over. The one magic number would 
be established, albeit with a serious shortcoming: you shouldn’t expect a clear and quick 
answer every time you are calling. The one person answering the call would after all be the 
Foreign Minister, a servant of the member states. In urgent cases, the President of the United 
States could still be tempted to call Berlin, Paris, and London directly.  
 
The U.S. would therefore not be forced to alter its conventional and tested way of dealing 
with the EU: deal with member states (possibly the big three) directly when in need of some 
quick reply, deal with the Foreign Minister when a cohesive EU position has already been 
established.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that for the foreseeable future the EU will be nothing more than a 
conglomerate of 27 sovereign nation states will enable the U.S. to continue to play these 
nations against each other whenever it deems this appropriate or useful. This is being 
attempted regularly and relatively openly (with Iraq being only one of many examples). This 
remains a nuisance to the Europeans but it is mostly their own weakness that’s inviting it.  
 If the U.S. wanted to do the EU a favour, the best thing she could do was keeping the pressure 
on. Keep on asking the tough questions, i.e. keep on demanding concrete policy suggestions 
instead of mere criticism. Can Europe provide an alternative? Can it provide useful insight 
and knowledge? Can it exercise leverage and chip in useful capacities? The U.S. should be 
prepared, however, to ask for this only if she were willing to make the Europeans real 
stakeholders in her own policy. Europe will be willing to accept American leadership as long 
as it will be taken serious, even though it might sometimes be weak. As this would keep the 




In conclusion, the proposed reforms for a new European treaty will not bring about the unified 
and strong actor many wish for. Leadership aversion will once more have its way. For 
Europeans the message is: the next round of reform talks is just around the corner. Try harder 
next time, especially in the field of foreign policy. While we do not need a strongly integrated 
Europe in all policy fields, we certainly need it in foreign policy.  
 
For Americans, the message is: when it comes to foreign policy, Europe will, for the time 
being, not be a fellow leader or even a competitor to the U.S.. The EU will be a partner at 
best. But it will also be the best partner the U.S. can get. It remains the ever-growing and 
never-ending challenge on both sides of the Atlantic to realize this and to make it understood 
to decision-makers, intellectuals, businessmen and the people in general. 
